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ABSTRACT 
 
ELIZABETH ELLIS: Are Not the Lands Our Own? Tunica Diplomacy in Spanish Louisiana 
and British West Florida 1763-1783 
(Under the Direction of Kathleen A. DuVal) 
 
Following the partition of French Louisiana in 1763, Spain and Britain strove to 
establish control of the Lower Mississippi Valley. Lacking the military might to rule their 
territorial spoils by force, British and Spanish colonial officials sought to build alliances with 
local Indigenous peoples, and use economic and political persuasion to press these Indian 
nations into exclusive imperial relationships. Spain and England hoped that these ties would 
help them lay claim to the territories inhabited by local nations, and grant them proxy rule 
over the lands. Despite European efforts to politically and geographically restrict the 
movements of Indian peoples, smaller tribes such as the Tunicas, recognized that residence 
along the Mississippi presented them with an opportunity. Rather than limiting their 
diplomatic relations to only one colony, during the 1760s and 1770s, the Tunicas cultivated 
alliances with both England and Spain and thereby sought to maintain a position of regional 
power. 
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Introduction 
 
 In October of 1772, Lattanash, the Great Medal Chief of the Tunicas journeyed down 
the Mississippi River to Fort Bute to clear up a misunderstanding. He knew that John 
Thomas, the English Indian agent at the fort, was frustrated with the Tunicas, and that he 
suspected that they were thinking of reneging on their alliance with the British and relocating 
to Spanish Louisiana. Thomas had good reason to question Tunica loyalty to the British, as 
members of the Indian nation frequently crossed the river into Louisiana and Lattanash 
himself had engaged in political negotiations with the Spanish officials on the other side. The 
Tunica Chief hoped that a council with the English would allow him to assuage Thomas’s 
concerns and to explain his motives for meeting with the Spanish at Pointe Coupée. While he 
intended to convince the British officials that the Tunicas desired their friendship and wished 
to remain as allies of the British King, Lattanash did not plan to apologize for his people’s 
regular border crossings, or for his attempts to win the favor of the Spanish. Rather, he would 
explain that for their own safety, the Tunicas desired “to be friends with all the white people 
near us” in both Spanish Louisiana and British West Florida.1  
 Following the conclusion of the Seven Years War, and France’s cession of the 
Louisiana territory to Spain and England, Indian nations within the Louisiana territory had to 
deal with new groups of “white people” and adapt to a changed colonial landscape. As part 
of the peace agreements, the great Mississippi, which previously had served to link the 
                                                
1 David K. Bjork, "Documents Regarding Indian Affairs in the Lower Mississippi Valley, 1771-1772," The 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 13, no. 3 (1926), 398-410; “Talk Between Charles Stuart and Small Tribes 
on the Mississippi,” October 17, 1772, fr. 806, vol. 74, reel 6, pt.1,  Records of the British Colonial Office, 
Library of Congress. 
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peoples of the region, was converted into a border between European empires. In his recent 
groundbreaking work, Before the Revolution, Daniel K. Richter argues that the Treaty of 
Paris of 1763 ended the ability of Indian nations to engage in play-off diplomacy, a dynamic 
he refers to as “a defining characteristic of the eighteenth-century Atlantean world.”2 
However, in the Lower Mississippi River Valley the drawing of a European imperial border 
on the American Indian landscape did not hinder the ability of native groups to shape 
European empires and develop relationships with dual colonial powers. Although most of the 
indigenous peoples who resided along the river were initially upset by the prospect of losing 
their French allies, this change proved advantageous for many of them.3 Whereas the Tunicas 
had had access to only one European colony during the first half of the eighteenth century, 
the Treaty of Paris provided them with two.  
  This division of land claims following the partition of French Louisiana in 1763 was 
an imperial attempt to impose a new political border on Native Americans living in the 
Lower Mississippi River Valley. Spanish and British agents struggled to force Indian nations 
to literally pick sides and bind their political and economic alliances to one bank and one 
colonial government. Spain and England hoped that exclusive relationships with native 
peoples would help them lay claim to the territories inhabited by local nations and that 
alliances with these tribes would give them a form of proxy rule over the lands. Despite 
European machinations, many smaller Indian tribes such as the Tunicas, recognized that 
residence along the Mississippi presented them with a unique opportunity. Rather than 
constricting their activities they carefully cultivated relationships with Spanish and English 
                                                
2 Daniel K. Richter, Before the Revolution: America’s Ancient Pasts (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2011), 406. 
 
3 Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green, North American Indians: Very Short Introductions (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 36. 
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officials. Although few in number, the Tunicas exploited their position by courting both 
England and Spain and managed to continue to straddle this fluid border politically, 
economically, and physically throughout the 1760s and 1770s.  
 
I. The Significance of the Petite Nations 
 If we consider that in 1764 the population of the entire Tunica nation was about 80 
people, one may wonder why the Tunicas should merit scholarly attention, or how focusing 
on their experience during this twenty year period could enhance our understanding of 
colonial Louisiana.4 To answer this question, let us step back for a moment and examine the 
trajectory of recent colonial historiography. Over the last thirty years the field of American 
Indian history has blossomed. Scholars such as James Merrell, Richard White, and Daniel K. 
Richter have refocused the lens of colonial history on indigenous peoples and rewritten tales 
of conquest and domination as stories of exchange and encounter. These “new” Indian 
histories in turn revolutionized modern scholarship on early America. My work expands the 
scope of peoples included in this scholarship and heightens our understanding of the period. 
The majority of research on colonial America has concentrated on explaining the experiences 
of more populous tribes, such as the Cherokees, Choctaws or Iroquois, whose presence is 
ubiquitous in the documentary record. This large-nation-centric approach omits the 
experiences of many Indian peoples and can oversimplify the dynamics of Indian and 
European interactions. In regions where smaller Indian groups abounded, like the Lower 
Mississippi River Valley, studies of large tribes can only provide a partial view of the 
colonial experience. 
                                                
4Jeffrey P. Brain, Tunica Archaeology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 316. 
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  Historian Daniel H. Usner estimates that there were 32,000 Native Americans in 
Louisiana in 1763. While three larger inland tribes comprised about 25,000 of these people, 
roughly 7,000 (22 percent) of these Indians were not part of the Choctaws, Chickasaws, or 
Upper Creeks. Given that the entire non-indigenous colonial population, including enslaved 
peoples, was only 9,300, small groups of American Indians comprised roughly 17 percent of 
the total number of residents in the Lower Mississippi River Valley.5 In the early eighteenth 
century, the French referred to the tiny tribes living along the gulf coast as the petite nations.6 
These petite nations were born out of the  “shock waves” of disease, warfare, and the slave 
raids linked to the expansion of the colonial trade system that penetrated the Mississippi 
River Valley during the sixteenth and seventeenth century, fracturing older and larger 
political groups.7   
 The Tunicas were one of these groups, and they serve as a prime example of the 
ability and successes of these small nations in navigating an ever changing political 
landscape and population in the Lower Mississippi Valley.8 The Tunica people first 
encountered Europeans along the Arkansas River. Although the early history of the Tunicas 
is somewhat uncertain, scholars agree that Hernando de Soto probably encountered ancestors 
of this tribe in the Quiz Quiz chiefdom in 1541.9 Maps from Soto’s expedition indicate that 
                                                
5 Daniel H. Usner, Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley 
Before 1783 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 279. See Usner p. 113 for a map of 
the Lower Mississippi River Valley. For the purposes of this study, the geographic space which I call “the 
Lower Mississippi River Valley” is the region between the Alabama and Sabine Rivers and roughly below 
modern day Memphis.  
 
6 Usner, Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy, 45. 
 
7Robbie Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw: The European Invasion and the Transformation of the 
Mississippian World 1540-1715 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 117. 
 
8Ethridge,  From Chicaza to Chickasaw. 133 
 
9Brain, Tunica Archaeology, 21-24; Ethridge,  From Chicaza to Chickasaw, 132-133. 
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this early site, a town called “Tanico,” was located near present day Hot Springs Arkansas, 
and abutted a salt source, indicating that the people of Tanico were most likely engaged in 
the salt trade.10 In the second half of the sixteenth century, Quiz Quiz and the other major 
chiefdoms of the Mississippi River Basin collapsed. It is unclear if this fracturing was the 
result of disease spread by Soto’s expedition, warfare, internal conflict or emigration. In any 
case, by 1673, when French explorers Louis Jolliet and Jaques Marquet entered the 
Mississippi region the Tunicas were living at the confluence of the Mississippi and Yazoo 
rivers.11 Archaeologist Jeffery P. Brain argues that the Tunicas can be clearly linked to 
Tanico based upon archaeological analysis of remnants of  “temple mounds” at the Tunica 
site along the Yazoo and through the continued role of this tribe in the salt trade in the 
seventeenth century.12 Either way, by the end of the seventeenth century the Tunicas were a 
relatively powerful group in the central Louisiana and Mississippi region and had carved out 
a niche for themselves in regional trade. This economic prominence encouraged the French 
to seek their alliance, and the Tunicas quickly engaged in the new colony’s goods and 
services exchange.13  
  At the onset of the eighteenth century less populous tribes like the Tunicas were 
prevalent along the Gulf Coast and the lower Mississippi. During their time in Louisiana, the 
French relied heavily on these petite nations for staple goods and for their services as guides, 
                                                
10Brain, Tunica Archaeology, 21-27. 
 
11 Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw, 12, 101; Brain Tunica Archaeology, 21-30. 
 
12 Brain, Tunica Archaeology, 294-297. 
 
13 Michael T. Pasquier, Louisiana Endowment for the Humanities, “Tunica Tribe” http://www.knowla.org/. 
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warriors, and informants.14 As the British and Spanish moved into the region after the Seven 
Years War, both powers quickly realized they too would need the support of local tribes in 
order to establish political presence in these lands. Ideally these nations would create human 
fences along the edges of the Spanish and British empires and enforce these borders in 
regions where the Europeans lacked military presence. In an attempt to secure the alliances 
of these many Indian residents, English and Spanish officials invested a tremendous amount 
of effort and capital in courting the nations of this region, large and small.15 
 Given the crucial importance of the Mississippi River to Spanish and British colonial 
ambitions, ensuring security along this waterway was a top priority. Theoretically, control of 
the Mississippi River would allow England or Spain access to both the Gulf of Mexico and 
the interior of the continent, either for trade or the movement of troops.16 Although in 1762 
Spain and England had agreed to free navigation for vessels of both nations on the 
Mississippi, safe passage along the river was by no means assured. Rather, as historian 
Robert Rea colorfully commented in his 1970 article on Lieutenant John Thomas,  European 
travelers on the Mississippi were “constantly subject to the dangers of redskinned 
highwaymen.”17 Rather than committing isolated events of banditry, as the term 
“highwaymen” implies, tribes like the Tunicas took advantage of their strategic position 
                                                
14 “Vaudreuil to Roille,” March 3, 1749, September 22, 1749, February 1, 1750, “Kerlerec to De Machault d’ 
Arnouville,” September 15, 1754, Mississippi Provincial Archives. French Dominion Ed. Dunbar Rowland and 
A. G. Sanders (Jackson: Press of the Mississippi Department of Archives and History, 1984), 5: 24, 34, 43-44, 
143-145. 
 
15Bjork, “Documents Regarding Indian Affairs in the Lower Mississippi Valley,” 398-410; Brain Tunica 
Archaeology, 305; “ Cedula and Orders 286”, October 30, 1781, Survey of Federal Archives, Confidential 
Dispatches of Don Bernardo de Gálvez, Fourth Spanish Governor of Louisiana, Sent to His Uncle Don José de 
Gálvez, Secretary of State and Ranking Official of the Council of the Indies, New Orleans, 1937-1938, 192.  
 
16Robert R. Rea, “Redcoats and Redskins on the Lower Mississippi 1763-1776: The Career of Lt. John 
Thomas,” Louisiana History, 11, no.1 (1970), 5-6. 
 
17 Rea, “Redcoats and Redskins on the Lower Mississippi,” 5. 
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along the Mississippi to assert power and keep unwelcome Europeans out of their lands. 
They used their small numbers and riverside location to thwart European imperial goals and 
to convince the Spanish and English to recognize the Tunicas’ rights to use lands on both 
sides of the border.  
 
 
18 
Village of the Tunicas 
 
II. European Land Claims and Indian Ground Control  
 From their village on the edge of the Mississippi, the Tunicas were able to both 
monitor and regulate traffic as it moved up and down the river. Tunica Bayou, the location 
                                                
18 Brain, Tunica Archaeology, 40.  
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where the tribe resided on the eve of the repartition, was located at a strategic bend in the 
river just above Pointe Coupée.19 At this point, the tortuous Mississippi doubled back on 
itself making a shape almost like a backwards number “3.” On the eastern bank a narrow 
portage ran between the top and bottom sections of this flowing “3” shaped curve connecting 
the two river points via a bayou (labeled “Portage of the Cross” on the map above.20 By 
crossing through this waterway, travelers could save about thirty miles, a notable distance 
especially when paddling upriver against the current.21 This shallow and swampy crossing 
was ideal for indigenous pirogues. Narrow, low-lipped and lightweight, these canoe-like 
vessels were designed for paddling through waters thick with vegetation and could easily be 
carried short distances across marshes or fallen cypress trees. Using the canes that grew in 
this region the Tunicas constructed low wattle and daub homes on the gentle bluffs 
overlooking this portage and cultivated corn in the soil fertilized by the runoff along the river 
banks. This elevated vantage point allowed the tribe a clear view of all those who struggled 
to navigate the muddy, churning waters. The strategic cut through meant the Tunicas were in 
a prime position to ambush travelers, if they were so inclined.22 
 The year 1764 was a tense time for the Tunicas. They knew that their old allies, the 
French, were in the process of leaving the region and that the British were moving into the 
lands on the east bank of the Mississippi. Historically the Tunicas were no friends of the 
                                                
19 Historical Sketches of the Several Indian Tribes in Louisiana, South of the Arkansas River, and Between the 
Mississippi and River Grande. Washington: [s.n.], 1806, 725. 
 
20 This cut through was called “portage de la croix” or “lac de la croix” by the French and “portage of the 
Cross” by the English in contemporary maps and is also referred to as Tunica bayou by Brain. Brain, Tunica 
Archaeology, 30-43. 
 
21 Robin Fabel and R, “The Letters of R: The Lower Mississippi in the Early 1770s,” Louisiana History, 24, no. 
4 (October 1, 1983), 414-415. 
 
22Brain, Tunica Archaeology, 296-297, 304; Robin Fabel and R, “The Letters of R,”  414-415. 
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British and felt threatened by their presence in the region. Indian allies of the British had 
conducted raids against the Tunicas throughout the French presence in the region and likely 
even before.23 Thus, the Tunicas decided in 1764 to keep the British from establishing a 
permanent settlement on their lands. In March, a group of Tunicas ambushed British Major 
John Loftus and his troops as they attempted to ascend the Mississippi River to Fort Chartres, 
a formerly French fort in the Illinios country. Loftus and his troops were on a mission upriver 
to set up forts and establish a military presence between the Gulf and the Illinois country. He 
was traveling with 400 men divided among twelve vessels. Part of the Loftus expedition’s 
aim was to assess the condition of the forts along the Mississippi and Iberville rivers. Beyond 
reconnaissance, this military venture was also part of a broader imperial strategy to assert 
British power in the Indian controlled interior. In the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region, 
British troops were embroiled in a bitter war against pan-tribal forces headed by Pontiac and 
other Native American leaders. Loftus’s 400 soldiers were to proceed north to assist in this 
war. Ideally, if the British were able to establish a presence in the Illinois region, they could 
then attack Pontiac’s forces from both the east and the west and prevent the spread of the 
uprising into Indian nations in the Southeast.24 
 The Tunicas, who numbered no more than 38 gunmen at this time, attacked Loftus at 
Davion’s Bluff, about eighty leagues above New Orleans (marked as Loftus Cliff on the map 
on the front page), killing six men and wounding seven others.25 In order to reach this 
                                                
23 Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw, 174-193.  
 
24 The New York Mercury, June 11, 1764, American Antiquarian Society/ News Bank, 2. 
 
25 There was some dispute among Loftus’s contemporaries as to the number of Indians actually engaged in the 
assault. The English claimed, as reported by the The New York Mercury, that there were 150 warriors engaged 
in the assault, from the Tunica (Tonika) Ouma (Houma) Chettimafhaw (Chittimacha) and Yaboo (Yazoo) 
tribes. French governor Jean Jacques Blaise D’abbadie, in addition to insisting that he had no part in 
orchestrating the attack, debated these claims. French reports suggest that the Houma did not participate in the 
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location, the boats had passed through the Tunicas’ homeland just below this point, giving 
the Indians time to plan for an assault. As the Loftus expedition entered the portion of the 
Mississippi in front of the bluffs, the Tunicas and several of their Avoyelle, Choctaw, and 
Ossagoula allies fired upon the Englishmen. The Major reported that the first volley came 
from the west bank, where an untold number of Indians were ensconced behind the thick 
brush. As Loftus and his men tried to maneuver away from the fire and engage their attackers 
they paddled toward the opposite bank; however, as they did so, a second round of shot 
rained upon them from the east side. According to The New York Mercury, which reported 
Loftus’s debacle in June of that year, “the commanding officer, seeing both sides so strongly 
guarded, and the river narrow, returned with the stream.”26 Surprised and unable to engage 
their enemies, Loftus and his men were forced to give up their mission and retreat back 
downriver. 27 
 The success of the Tunicas in preventing the Loftus expedition from crossing through 
their territory convinced the British that they had to negotiate with the small nations along 
the Mississippi. They could not risk engaging Indian enemies both on what they considered 
safe territory as well as in the contested interior of the continent. Although they were few in 
number, the Tunicas made it known that they could cause major problems for the English if 
they attempted to bypass negotiating with the tribe. Furthermore the Tunicas had 
demonstrated their ability to influence and organize other local tribes. By December of 1764 
                                                                                                                                                  
assault and that some Choctaw were involved, they also place the total number of Indian attackers at 50. The 
New York Mercury, June 11, 1764,  American Antiquarian Society/ News Bank 1764, 2. 
 
26 The New York Mercury, June 11, 1764, American Antiquarian Society/ News Bank 1764, 2. 
 
27 Clarence Edwin Carter, Great Britain and the Illinois Country, 1763-1774 (Washington: The American 
Historical Association, 1910), 32-37; David K. Bjork, The Establishment of Spanish Rule in the Province of 
Louisiana, PhD Diss. 1762-1770 (University of California, 1923), 38-42; The New York Mercury, June 11, 
1764, American Antiquarian Society/ News Bank 1764 2. 
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the English had decided that the Tunicas were the “leading nation” on this part of the 
Mississippi.28  
 By 1772, the British officials were holding regular meetings with the Tunicas to hear 
the concerns of the chief and reward the tribe’s headmen with gifts. Beyond preventing the 
British from establishing a fort on their homeland, with the Loftus attack the Tunicas had 
proven their importance to the new colonial powers and positioned themselves to make 
demands of those who wished to travel the Mississippi in safety. Essentially, in the 1760s the 
British and Spanish learned the lesson historians are just now beginning to grasp: they could 
not afford to ignore small Indian nations.29 
  Traditional histories of the Spanish and British empires in the Lower Mississippi 
Valley tend to characterize these Indians simply as “vassals” of the European monarchs and 
posit that these groups were easy to control as long as they were given adequate gifts. Even 
some more recent, and Indian-focused, scholarship also supports the notion that Indian 
efforts to assert power, such as the assault on the Loftus expedition, were usually the result of 
European political machinations.30 While the presence of the French, Spanish and British 
influenced the Tunicas, it is equally unjust to ignore the motives of these small Indian tribes 
and their influence on European efforts to construct colonies. In 1764, the Spanish had not 
                                                
28 Dunbar Rowland, and Robert Farmar, Mississippi Provincial Archives. English Dominion. (Nashville, Tenn.: 
Press of Brandon Printing Co., 1911), 267. 
 
29 David K. Bjork, The Establishment of Spanish Rule in the Province of Louisiana, PhD Diss. (University of 
California, 1923), 38-42; Talk Between Charles Stuart and Small Tribes on the Mississippi, October 17, 1772, fr. 
806 vol. 74, reel 6, pt.1.  Records of the British Colonial Office, Library of Congress. 
 
30The New York Mercury, June 11, 1764, American Antiquarian Society/ News Bank 1764, 2; Rea, “Redcoats 
and Redskins,” 6; Brain,  Tunica Archaeology, 303; Other scholars, such as Clarence Carter, have also 
suggested that the written correspondence between Gage and Abaddie does not indicate that the French 
were responsible for inciting the Tunicas to attack Major Loftus. However, it is clear that the French 
were not particularly upset with the Tunicas as the result of the attack, as the Tunicas were publicly 
received by the governor. Clarence Edwin Carter, Great Britain and the Illinois Country, 1763-1774 
(Washington: The American Historical Association, 1910), 32-35. 
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arrived to occupy Louisiana, so French governor Jean Jacques Blaise d’Abbadie was still in 
place in New Orleans. Trying to keep the transitions peaceful, he told Lattanash he was angry 
with the Tunicas for attacking Loftus. In detailing his reasons to Governor d’Abbadie, 
Lattanash passionately explained his conflict with the English: 
the English have always destroyed the nations. They have given them to drink 
liquors which have made them die. When I knew that they were coming into 
our territory I said: they will make us die, it is better to kill them. 31 
 
Lattanash then told d’Abbadie that he realized that the French were angry with the Tunicas 
because of this attack, but that he believed he had to prevent the English from coming into 
Tunica territory to protect his people. While this assault was certainly a risky move, the 
Tunicas knew the English as the Europeans who controlled the Indian slave markets in the 
east, and they determined that they simply could not permit them to establish a military 
presence so near the nation. Additionally, the Loftus attack may have been simply a power-
play on the part of the Tunicas. Lattanash and the other leaders recognized an opportunity to 
prove to the British and Spanish colonists that despite European land claims, they controlled 
the land along the Mississippi, and could pose a threat to European security if their alliance 
was not obtained. Not only was Lattanash not controlled by French imperial aims, he and his 
people flatly rejected their French ally’s requests for peaceful relations with the English. 
They pursued their own course of political negotiations.    
 Although it may be easier to uncover the goals of English Indian agents than of the 
Indians themselves, the documentary record shows that the Tunicas or other small groups 
never blindly obeyed the requests of their Spanish and English allies nor even that the 
Europeans were the only ones making demands. While historians have traditionally paid 
                                                
31 David K. Bjork, The Establishment of Spanish Rule in the Province of Louisiana, PhD Diss. (University of 
California, 1923), 38-42. (italics mine) 
  13 
more attention to European attempts to regulate Indian diplomacy, at least through 1783, it is 
evident that the Tunicas also attempted to manipulate the English and Spanish, and at times 
they succeeded. 
 
 
Major Powers Along the Mississippi 32 
 
III. A Fluid Border 
 The end of the Seven Years War in 1763 marked the termination of France’s status as 
a dominant state in the struggle for empire in mainland North America. The Treaty of Paris, 
which officially concluded the conflict, resulted in a reconfiguration of international 
                                                
32 Bernard Romans, A General Map of the Southern British Colonies in America (London: R. Sayer and J. 
Bennett, 1776). 
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boundaries within the continent. The British and their Indian allies emerged victorious from 
this war, and consequently the Crown was able to claim sizable territorial spoils in North 
America. As part of the peace agreements, French King Louis XV ceded all of his colonial 
land holdings east of the Mississippi to the British. In an effort to convince the Spanish to 
surrender, France made a covert deal to give its wartime ally the western half of the 
Louisiana territory, plus the Isle of Orleans. Louisiana had few European settlers and a large 
indigenous population, produced no cash crops, had a minimally profitable fur trade, and was 
prone to floods and hurricanes. In spite of these unappealing aspects, Spanish King Carlos III 
agreed to take this landmass because it would serve as a buffer between the English colonies 
and Spanish holdings in Texas and Mexico. Spanish fear of English expansion and English 
concerns over another war with Spain created a climate of tension in the Lower Mississippi 
Valley. In the subsequent decades both powers struggled to find policies that would secure 
these newly acquired lands and prevent external incursions by other Europeans and their 
Indian allies. Thus, England and Spain sought to convert the muddy, Mississippi, which had 
long linked the peoples of this region, into a firm border.33 
 As declared in 1767 in an official brief given to the Spanish Council of the Indies, His 
Catholic Majesty King Carlos III envisioned this river as a “fixed and definite boundary for 
                                                
33Gilbert C. Din, “The First Spanish Instructions for Arkansas Post November 15, 1769,” The Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly 53, no. 3 (October 1, 1994), 312-319; “Francisco Rendon to Carondelet,” May 4, 1795, 
Survey of Federal Archives, Louisiana, Dispatches of the Spanish Governors of Louisiana 1766-1792 (New 
Orleans, 1937-1938) 5:  218; Gilbert C. Din “Protecting the ‘Barrera’: Spain’s Defenses in Louisiana, 1763-
1779,” Louisiana History, 19, no. 2 (April 1, 1978), 183-211; Usner, Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier 
Exchange Economy, 105-107; Arthur S. Aiton, “The Diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession,” The Louisiana 
Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History: Vol II. The Spanish Presence in Louisiana 1763-1803, Ed. 
Gilbert C. Din (Lafayette: University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1996); David K. Bjork, The Establishment of 
Spanish Rule in The Province of Louisiana, 11-12; Alan Taylor and Eric Foner, American Colonies, (New 
York: Viking, 2001), 385-386. 
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his royal possessions in North America.”34 However, creating an impermeable border was far 
more difficult than issuing a decree. In addition to indigenous peoples, who regularly crossed 
the Mississippi, the Spanish struggled to prevent British traders from traveling into 
Louisiana. Throughout the 1760s and 1770s, Spanish colonial officials ineffectively tried to 
enforce trade laws that were designed to limit Indian contact to traders whom the Spanish 
government approved. Ideally, and in combination with Spanish attempts to halt Indian 
border crossing, this policy would limit the spread of British political influences among tribes 
in Spanish territory and force the indigenous peoples to cooperate with the Spanish if they 
desired access to European goods.35 Spanish officials reasoned that if Indians did not have 
access to another European political and economic partner they would be more likely to 
support the Spanish presence.  
 While Spain was particularly slow to occupy its forts, the English proved more 
anxious to tackle the task of governing their new western possessions. It is perhaps indicative 
of Spain’s reticence that it was not until 1765 that Antonio de Ulloa was appointed the first 
governor and Captain General of Louisiana, and began the task of establishing political and 
economic control in the colony.36 England moved into the region more rapidly and within a 
year of the treaty was in the process of establishing forts and outposts along the edges of 
West Florida. Both England and Spain recognized that if the two powers were to go to war 
again, a strong frontier defense would be essential, and whichever nation held control of the 
Mississippi would have tremendous military advantage.  They also realized that only with the 
                                                
34 David K. Bjork, The Establishment of Spanish Rule in The Province of Louisiana, 100. 
 
35 Lawrence Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794, (Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1946-
1949.) xxiii-xxvi. As previously mentioned, Usner calculates that there were 9,300 Europeans and Africans 
(including enslaved persons) in the Lower Mississippi Valley in 1763. Usner, Indians, Settlers and Slaves in a 
Frontier Exchange Economy, 279. 
 
36Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794, xv.  
  16 
alliances and military support of the Indian peoples along the river would either Spanish or 
British forces be able to control the Mississippi. Thus, in order to secure this strategic 
waterway, and to provide frontier security for their territories, the Europeans would need to 
gain native support. Therefore, although Spain and England each initially tried to minimize 
dependence on the native peoples of the region, both colonies were shortly forced to deal 
with Indian nations, as the French had before them. 
 Correspondence from the 1760s demonstrates that the British understood local Indian 
nations to pose very real threats to colonial security. In a letter dated March of 1764, English 
Major Robert Farmar wrote to the Secretary of War from Mobile that he and his men were 
surrounded by large numbers of armed Indians, and that his powder and provisions had all 
been soaked and rendered useless.  As he explained, “the fort and the garrison [are] so very 
weak as makes it impossible to be supported or kept teneable in case of Rupture, so that 
every means of support for the Troops are at present expos’d to the ravages of the 
Savages.”37 Farmar’s correspondence indicates that the English forces did not have control of 
the territory. The post at Mobile was roughly half way between the eastern and western edges 
of the province of West Florida and located along the Gulf coast. If the British felt threatened 
and weak at Mobile, they absolutely were not in control of the lands further north. What they 
called “West Florida” was actually the dominion of the Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, 
Flatheads, Tunicas, and many other Indian groups. Thus, much like Loftus, Farmar 
discovered that it was impossible to accomplish military missions in the former French 
Louisiana territory without the support of the native inhabitants. Since they were unwilling to 
send substantial military forces to West Florida, an expenditure which would have been 
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especially taxing as the British were currently involved in fighting Indian uprisings in the 
Ohio country and recovering from the Seven Years War, the English in the Mississippi 
Valley had to learn to negotiate with and appease the indigenous peoples, including the 
Tunicas. 
 On the other side of the river, the Spanish were also struggling to develop a workable 
relationship with Indians. Unlike in Florida or Texas, the Spanish did not attempt to establish 
missions or encomiendas in Louisiana. Rather, they assessed that the most effective policy 
for retaining colonial possession of the less densely populated lands was to adopt the French 
practices of establishing alliances with the local Indian nations and providing them with 
annual gifts and trade in exchange for political alliance and military support. However, as 
early as 1768, Ulloa was already complaining that these friendships were entirely too 
expensive. He insisted that the “Indians cannot be despotic in their demands, and that they 
must not be given everything they are minded to ask for.” He particularly resented their 
“threats of attack if they are not gratified every time they come to the forts.”38Although Ulloa 
wanted to reduce the amount spent on the Indians each year, his protest demonstrates that 
local tribes were capitalizing on the military weakness and economic opportunities of the 
newly arrived Spanish colonizers. In recognizing that the Spanish were desperately in need of 
their support, in some instances tribes basically bullied Spanish  officials into giving them 
“everything they are minded to ask for.” 
 Within the first decade of occupation, Spanish officials came to acknowledge their 
reliance on the assistance of Indian nations to support the colony and protect this 
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international border.39 Just one year after Ulloa’s initial insistence that excessive generosity 
was bad policy, the new Spanish Governor Alejandro O’Reily provided the Tunicas, who 
were then living on the east side of the Mississippi, with twice as many presents as the Petite 
Nations residing in Spanish territory.40 By 1770 the Tunicas were listed among the top 
expenditures for smaller tribes along the Mississippi in Spanish statements of expenses for 
Indian presents in the “Ylinueses” (Illinois) region.41 Evidently, the new Spanish governor 
had decided the Tunicas were worth the expense.  
 Spanish aims to befriend the Tunicas and other local tribes were part of bigger plan to 
establish a human fence around Spanish North America. Ideally the Louisiana territory 
would serve as a buffer zone for English expansion from the east and Britain’s Indian allies 
from the north. As the Spanish could not muster sufficient  manpower to control northern 
Texas, they relied upon Indians they called the “Norteños” to keep out the English.42  Using 
similar tactics to those the French had employed in the region, the Spanish attempted to lure 
the Norteños into settling closer to Spanish settlements with gifts and trade opportunities.43  
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 Although, as Ulloa noted, the practice of gift giving and hosting Indian groups at 
diplomatic conferences was expensive,  Spanish officials came to understand that it was not 
as costly as war. As such, the Spanish governors determined that the most frugal and 
effective way to ensure the creation of this barrier was to court the Indian nations with 
promises of gifts, trade, and military alliance. 44 In his instructions to his nephew Don 
Bernardo de Gálvez as he became governor of Louisiana, Minister of the Indies José de 
Gálvez emphasized the importance of winning the alliance of local Indians.45 He charged 
Bernardo de Gálvez not to neglect any reasonable effort to win over the local Indian groups, 
and to make sure to attend Indian councils and hold meetings with the tribes on a regular 
basis. As the Minister wrote, “one of the very essential objects of your attention should be to 
attract the neighboring tribes of Indians to alliances and good relation with the Government 
and Colonists of Louisiana.” He told Governor Gálvez to increase spending on Indians in 
order to achieve alliances “upon which may depend for the most part, the security of that 
colony, and so that in time the Indians may be reduced to our holy Faith and Dominion.”46  
 Official correspondence between Minister José de Gálvez and Governor Bernardo de 
Gálvez also reflects Spanish anxiety about being outdone by the English, whom the Spanish 
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blamed for Native Americans’ extravagant gift expectations. José de Gálvez requested that 
his nephew observe and monitor the English and their interactions with the local tribes and 
send back reports of their behavior. Governor Gálvez’s assignment also included explicit 
instructions to attempt to win the allegiance of those tribes who were allied with the British.47  
 The British, who were well aware of the efforts of the Spanish, simultaneously made 
efforts to draw the “little nations” along the Mississippi onto their side. During the 1760s 
British fears of pan-tribal uprisings such as Pontiac’s War and the creation of the Shawnee 
coalition at Scioto, shaped imperial Indian policy.48 In the early 1770s concerns about the 
possibility of war between England and Spain over the Falkland Islands re-energized Spanish 
and English efforts to court local tribes of all sizes along the border.49 Then in the mid 1770s, 
as a possible rupture between England and the Atlantic colonies loomed, Spanish and British 
officials again readied for a multi-theater confrontation. Clearly, by the 1770s, the alliance of 
the nations along the Mississippi was at a premium, and the Tunicas were in an ideal position 
to exploit the anxieties of the Spanish and English colonists. 50 
 
 
                                                
47 “Royal Instruction from José Gálvez to Don Bernardo,” Section II- Spanish Colonial Period, 1769-1803, 
Rosamonde E. and Emile Kuntz Collection 1655-1878, Louisiana Research Collection, Tulane University. 
#600-3-66; “José Gálvez to Bernardo de Gálvez,” Section II- Spanish Colonial Period, 1769-1803, Rosamonde 
E. and Emile Kuntz Collection 1655-1878, Louisiana Research Collection, Tulane University #600-3-63; It is 
worth noting that Governor Ulloa was not a particularly effective colonial Governor, and that he was ousted 
shortly after he arrived in New Orleans during a bloodless uprising against the Spanish colonial government in 
1768. see John Preston Moore, “‘The Good Wine of Bordeaux’: Antonio de Ulloa,” in The Louisiana Purchase 
Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History vol. II, Ed. Gilbert C. Din (Lafayette, University of Southwestern 
Louisiana 1996), 59-70. 
 
48 The British correctly perceived Shawnee efforts to unite militant tribes through congresses at Scioto in 1769 
and 1771 to be a very real threat to the stability of British presence in the Southeast. Fabel, Colonial 
Challenges, 108.  
 
49 Fabel, Colonial Challenges, 108,132. 
 
50 “John Stuart to William Howe,” October 6, 1777, Carleton Papers, Library of Congress, 695-696. 
  21 
 
 
51 
Sauvage Matachez en Guerrier 
 
IV. Tunica Evolutions 
 Whether the petite nations could manage to hold onto their homelands, support their 
members, and wield substantial power over the political and economic situation in the 
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seemingly ever shifting political landscape of the Lower Mississippi Valley in the eighteenth 
century was largely determined by their political adaptability and diplomatic finesse. The 
ability of the Tunicas to forge multiple alliances while simultaneously maintaining neutrality 
allowed them to make demands of the Spanish and British, which were remarkable given 
their small size, and to reduce the amount of violence they suffered at the hands of larger 
tribes.  
 In 1772, British Deputy Superintendent Charles Stuart was irritated. The Spanish, it 
seemed to him, had been all too successful in convincing the little tribes along the 
Mississippi to re-settle on their side. Although it is evident that both British and Spanish 
officials were aware of each other’s covert efforts to coax local nations on both sides of the 
border into alliances, technically, the European powers had promised not to interfere with 
Indians outside of their respective territories. In1772, in a letter to his cousin, Indian 
Superintendent John Stuart, Charles Stuart complained that he could find no reason, other 
than devious Spanish influence, that the Tunicas had moved to the west bank given the “local 
attachment Indians are known to have to their Mother Ground.”52 Perhaps if the English had 
been aware of the Tunicas’ history of relocation and re-invention they would have been less 
surprised by their willingness to leave their homelands and move across the river. In the two 
centuries before the Revolutionary Era, the Tunicas had moved at least five times, been part 
of large chiefdoms and tiny bands, and had been identified by colonial settlers as salt traders, 
hunters, soldiers, agriculturalists, guides and even Christian converts.53 In short, the Tunicas 
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were a highly adaptable people, a characteristic which helps us to understand the success of 
their diplomatic efforts in the eighteenth century.  
 Throughout the 1700s, the Tunicas sought to use the French, Spanish and English 
presence to protect their people from inter-tribal violence and their lands from aggressive 
settlers. Although they had enjoyed successes in the indigenous and colonial trade networks, 
the Tunicas were in a precarious position at the beginning of the eighteenth century. During 
the first decades of French colonization, other Indian nations, not Europeans, posed the 
largest threats to the tribe. Firstly, Native Americans from the east continuously raided the 
small tribes of the south for prisoners to sell to English slave traders. The Chickasaws in 
particular posed a serious threat to the petite nations, as a major part of their political and 
economic ties to the British centered around their role as suppliers of Indian slaves for the 
Atlantic colonies.54 The second threat came from other small tribes within the region, who 
also frequently attacked the villages of their enemies.55 Endemic small scale violence 
fostered a climate of instability in the region. Although the Tunicas numbered roughly one 
thousand in 1700, they still were small enough in comparison to larger nations, like the 
Chickasaws, that they struggled to defend themselves from larger nations and therefore 
welcomed French offers of protection.56 We can see the effect of this chronic raiding in the 
Tunicas’ flight south to Portage de la Croix in 1706. Early alliances with the French probably 
had made the Tunicas a prime target for the Chickasaws, whose extensive slave trade 
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networks moved indigenous peoples from the Lower Mississippi Valley to English markets 
on the Eastern seaboard. In an effort to move closer to the French settlements, where they 
hoped to be better protected from the Chickasaw raids, the Tunicas fled downriver and 
moved into the town of the Houmas at Portage de la Croix.57 From this better protected 
location the Tunicas were able to expand their trade networks to include French traders and 
they exchanged salt, staple foodstuffs, and limited numbers of furs, for European guns and 
material goods. 
 The Tunicas remained at this location until 1731 when Natchez raids forced them to 
move again. In addition to furnishing the French settlers with food, the Tunicas also provided 
their services as guides, informants and warriors. During the 1710s and 1720s Tunica men 
participated in the French military campaigns against the Natchez Indians.58 Under the brutal 
assault, the Natchez nation as a cohesive group collapsed. The remaining Natchez refugees 
were absorbed by other nations or fled the region. In June 1731, the Tunicas adopted a group 
of these Natchez into their nation. Adoption was a crucial practice for the Tunicas and other 
petite nations in this violent and unstable land.59 By incorporating outsiders into the tribe 
they strengthened numbers and expanded kinship networks; however, this process was not 
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without its risks.60 By 1726 the Tunicas had experienced a massive population decline and 
according the to Governor of Louisiana’s estimate, could muster only 120 warriors. Given 
what must have been a traumatic period of loss, the Tunicas were most likely seeking to 
expand in 1730, and hoped the Natchez would help strengthen their small community. 
However, within a month of their arrival, the Natchez refugees launched a stealthy dawn 
attack on the Tunica people. At the end of the bloodshed, the Tunicas had lost half of their 
warriors.61Once again, in the wake of tremendous violence the Tunicas fled downriver. The 
tribe consolidated into a single village and settled on Tunica Bayou. From here they could 
easily access New Orleans via the Mississippi, their old lands at Portage de la Croix and the 
Red River. They continued to engage in small scale trade with the French and to work for 
them as guides and soldiers, now more than ever eager to use to French military presence to 
ensure their security.62  
 Although the Tunicas were relatively few in number, they excelled at marketing 
themselves as steadfast friends and strategic allies of the French. During the French period 
the Tunicas had limited options for engaging in the play-off diplomacy with other European 
powers. Due to their small size and limited geographic range they did not have ready access 
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to the Spanish or British and therefore were unable to rely on the classic European 
competition tactics which worked so well for the larger nations in the Mississippi River 
Valley.63 However, the Tunicas were certainly among the most successful in courting the 
French settlers. In 1730 the Governor of Louisiana Etienne Perier complained that the 
Tunicas were “the only Savage Nation truly friends of the French.”64  
 Although the Tunicas may have successfully convinced the French of their devotion, 
and seemed limited in their options for European alliances, it is evident that the Tunicas also 
cultivated relationships with others whose alliances might be advantageous, including 
powerful indigenous nations. In 1713 the Tunicas conducted a calumet ceremony with 
British trader Price Hughes while he was touring the region, simultaneously reminding the 
French that they had alternative diplomatic options and probably seeking to demonstrate to 
the Chickasaws that they were friends of the British.65 Calumet ceremonies were formal 
rituals that cemented friendship and political alliances between two groups.66 Again in the 
1730s the Tunicas raised French hackles when they were implicated in a scheme among the 
Red River tribes to form an alliance with the Chickasaws. 67 By uniting themselves with the 
Chickasaws, the Tunicas could gain access to English trade goods through Chickasaw 
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networks, but perhaps more importantly, they would not have to fear assaults by the 
Chickasaws. The French and some historians have interpreted these events as British power 
plays which were intended to “seduce” the Tunicas and other small nations into abandoning 
their French allies.68 However, given the pressure the Tunicas were facing from the 
Chickasaw, and their efforts to emphasize their importance and loyalty to the French, these 
negotiations were most likely driven by the Tunicas’ desire to stymie Chickasaw attacks. 
Although the Tunicas may well have wanted to establish relationships with the British,  their 
diplomatic maneuverings probably had more to do with the tribe’s desire for security within 
its homelands than the influences of British subversion. Additionally, historians should not 
interpret these exchanges as a purely european centered diplomatic incidents. Rather, the 
Tunicas’ actions indicate that they were seeking to engage in a type of play off diplomacy 
between the French and the Chickasaws, thereby using their alliance with a European nation 
not for leverage with another colonial power, but with a formidable Indian group. 
  Similarly to the English and Spanish, the Tunicas were also searching for a workable 
diplomatic policy in the 1760s and 1770s. Given the Tunicas’ experiences with the 
widespread violence and instability fueled by the British slave trade, one can understand why 
the Tunicas reacted so violently to a British presence on their doorstep. Following the Loftus 
skirmish, the Tunicas first “fled” to Mobile, claiming fear of English retribution and then in 
April turned to the French for assistance. After reprimanding the Tunicas for their attack 
D’Abbadie resettled the Tunicas by Bayou Lafourche. However, the tribe did not remain 
there for more than a few months before returning to their old location. Given the rapid 
relocations of the Tunicas, it appears that they were not actually as frightened of the English 
as they perhaps wanted the French governor to believe and that this movement was likely 
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part of an elaborate diplomatic plan. Once they had settled their grievances with the British 
they moved back to the east side about a league above Pointe Coupée.69 Based upon their 
extremely brief stays in both Mobile and Bayou LaFourche, therefore it is reasonable to 
conclude that the Tunicas had planned on moving out of their homelands for just long 
enough to let British anger dissipate, before returning to negotiate. 
 This move marks the beginning of the delicate diplomacy the Tunicas managed to 
conduct for the next decade. They regularly crossed the Mississippi throughout this period. 
The Tunicas farmed on the western side, but kept their houses on the eastern side and relied 
upon their traditional hunting lands there. As a result, Tunica peoples regularly came into 
contact with both Spanish and English subjects. Despite the best efforts of the Spanish and 
English officials, the petite nations mostly refused to abide their requests to remain in either 
West Florida or Louisiana. In 1772 Charles Stuart explained that many of the small nations 
lived on the Spanish side, but continued to hunt and plant on English territory. In fact his 
comment that “the Alibamons I found to be the only indians at present residing on one side 
of the river,” signifies that this transnational travel was the norm. 70 The frequency of 
“border” crossings among the petite nations shows that the Treaty of Paris did not 
fundamentally change the way these smaller tribes saw their lands or cause them to recognize 
European claims in the region. The border was clearly not a division that they acknowledged. 
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V. Medals and Alliances 
 By 1772 Lattanash was an old man. Perhaps the soldiers at Fort Bute would have 
been able to recognize him from a distance. Most likely he was dressed in European clothes 
and worn both European and indigenous jewelry for the formal occasion, and of course his 
prestigious medals of alliance. No one would have mistaken him for a European, however, as 
his skin probably was heavily marked with ceremonial tattoos and ritual scarification created 
by dragging sharpened fishbones across the skin. He arrived with a group of Tunica leaders, 
who were dressed and scarred similarly, although most likely wearing fewer European 
garments. As Lattanash spoke to the English during the Indian council, he remarked that he 
expected to die soon and wished that his nephew would succeed him as Great Medal Chief of 
the Tunicas. Lattanash had served as a tribal headman since at least 1731. Initially he and 
Bride-les-Boeufs, another Tunica and possibly the war chief, shared power. During the early 
eighteenth century the political leadership within the nation was commonly shared among 
several men. However, when Bride-les-Boeufs died in 1763, Lattanash took the opportunity 
to secure a position of political dominance. Lattanash was an imposing figure. A shrewd 
negotiator and a proud man, he would not bend to European desires, or play the role of 
lackey as the colonial officials had hoped. This wizened, tattooed and scarred, tough old 
Indian was the man with whom the English would have to negotiate.71 
 During the ten months preceding this Indian council, relations between the English  
and Spanish colonial officials had become especially strained as the result of the Tunicas’ 
diplomatic maneuvering. The Tunicas, who were residing about a league above Pointe 
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Coupée, but on the eastern side, had been courting both Spanish and English officials and 
had made efforts to gain the friendship of both powers. Lattanash realized that if they could 
maintain alliances with both of these nations, the Tunicas would be able to comfortably move 
back and forth across the Mississippi as they wished, and exploit dual trade and military 
partnerships. However, as we have seen, neither the English or Spanish officials were eager 
to share the affections of Indian nations living within the boundaries of their empires.72 
 International tensions over securing the allegiance of the Tunicas came to a head in 
December of 1771, when Lattanash reported to Indian Agent John Thomas that Bathazar de 
Villiers, the Spanish commanding officer at Pointe Coupée, had attempted to wrest an 
English medal from his neck. While this may seem like a minor misunderstanding, the 
practices of giving and wearing medals carried great significance for Indians and colonial 
officials in the Lower Mississippi Valley. Essentially, by attempting to remove this medal, 
which was a physical marker of Lattanash’s alliance with the English, the Spanish officer 
was trying to force Lattanash to sever his ties with the British. Given the severity of this 
gesture, John Thomas would have would have recognized this move as nothing less than a 
international provocation.73 
 The practice of presenting indigenous leaders with medals was a cardinal component 
of colonial Indian diplomacy in Spanish Louisiana. The presentation of these medals was 
generally part of a more elaborate process of securing alliances with native peoples. 
Typically the Spanish governor, or other government officials, would host a gathering of the 
headmen of one or more Indian nations, such as the reception Governor Alejandro O’Reily 
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hosted for the Tunicas, Taensas, Pacanas, Houmas, Bayagoulas, Ofogoulas, Chaouachas, and 
Ouchas in 1769. This type of ceremony generally involved feasting, smoking, distribution of 
presents to the chiefs, extensive speeches by both Indian and Spanish leaders, and music. 
These formal gatherings could last for days, and blended European and indigenous 
diplomatic routines. At the aforementioned conference of small local tribes, leaders from 
each nation waved fans over Governor O’Reilly and symbolically laid their weapons at his 
feet. In return O’Reilly presented each chief with a Spanish medal.74  
  Medals were markers of external alliances and of authority within Indian nations. 
Spanish medals, literally metal discs, were clearly marked with symbols of imperial Spain 
and laced with ribbon so they could be worn around the neck. Only the leaders whom the 
Spanish recognized as figures of authority within indigenous groups received these medals. 
Therefore, to have a medal was essentially to be recognized as being in charge of tribal 
foreign relations. Furthermore, the Spanish distributed large medals to those Indian leaders 
who seemed to wield the most power within the region, and they gave smaller medals to 
those whom they considered to be of lesser import. These medals helped affirm political 
power and prestige within native groups as well as to other Indians and Europeans. Similar to 
the practice of flying a Spanish, French or British flag over a village, the practice of wearing 
a medal was an obvious and portable marker of Indian friendship with a colonial power. 
Alternatively, refusing to wear a Spanish medal, or to relinquish a French or English medal, 
would signify a rejection of allegiance to Spain.75 
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 Upon hearing of this incident, Thomas composed a scolding letter to the Spanish 
Governor Don Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga. In this missive he warned Unzaga not to interfere 
with the Tunicas or other small tribes who resided on British territory. Thomas wrote that “it 
is a well known fact that the Indians have been urged to kill and pillage His Britannic 
Majesty’s subjects on the Mississippi River since the peace.” Thomas threatened that if the 
Spanish continued to try and turn the tribes against the British “a proper reprisal will take 
place.” Furthermore, he insinuated that if the Spanish should attempt to pry away the 
loyalties of the Indians, the English would also begin to court the indigenous peoples living 
on the opposite side of the river, a tactic which could destabilize Spanish control of the 
region. Bathazar de Villiers promptly responded to Thomas, dismissing Lattanash’s story as a 
fabrication and flatly denying that he had attempted to take the medal by force. In closing he 
advised Thomas that “if we wish to conserve the tranquility necessary to the well-being of 
the subjects who are under our care, it is necessary that we resolve not to put any trust in the 
talk and promises of the different nations. Their only purpose is to gain the greatest 
advantages for themselves.”76 
 It is impossible to tell from these hearsay accounts whether Villiers actually 
attempted to tear the medal from Lattanash’s neck, or if the chief simply gave Villiers the 
medal, as the commandant claimed. What is clear from Villiers’s account is that Lattanash 
indeed “considered only his own and his people’s interests.” Thus when Lattanash came 
down to participate in the “talks” at Fort Bute in October, he aimed to calm and re-affirm his 
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friendship with the British, but not to fold under British pressure to convince the Tunicas to 
abandon their relations with the Spanish.  As he said to the British 
I heard you was angry at my having this Medal + Spanish Colours why 
would you be angry at that, I had the medal before the English Come here and 
as for the Colours I gave my old one to the Arkansas and the Commandant at 
Pointe Coupe give me another for it. 
We are freemen and never heard that the English wanted to make 
slaves of us. We want to be friends with all the White People near us, as we 
live amongst them and are we not free to go to which side of the River we 
please are not the lands our Own?77  
 
As the record of his speech to the English made clear, he was using this opportunity to re-
affirm his nation’s power in the region and reject English and Spanish attempts to impose a 
European border on Tunica lands. While Lattanash recognized that the Spanish and English 
officials each claimed control of the lands on one side of the Mississippi, Lattanash did not 
believe that those borders applied to the Indian inhabitants of the region. Rather, he 
understood them as European borders that restricted Europeans only.  
 In his lifetime Lattanash witnessed tremendous political and demographic change in 
the Lower Mississippi Valley. Surely he had grown up hearing stories of Mississippian times, 
of life when the Tunicas numbered more than ten times the size of their population in 1772. 
He had seen the French come and go. He was clearly aware of the strained relationship 
between the Spanish and English, and he probably realized this dynamic was likely to lead 
eventually to war and another political re-mapping of the region. Lattanash surely recognized 
the transience of the European powers, and was trying to sculpt a diplomatic policy that 
would aid the Tunicas both in the short and long term. In developing amiable relations with 
both the British and Spanish, the Tunicas gained political alliances, annual presents, and 
trade connections in the short term. Perhaps more importantly though, by remaining “neutral” 
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the Tunicas were preparing for the next power restructuring, and ensuring that they would 
not be punished for allying with the wrong power.  
 Alliances with European powers also aided the Tunicas in inter-tribal politics. In his 
speech at Fort Bute Lattanash explained that the Tunicas must be able to use the lands across 
the river in Spanish territory because “the hunting grounds on this side are poor because we 
[fear] offenses of the Creeks78 we are glad to be friends with every white man + if the Enemy 
drive us from this side, as they have already done to some of my Red Brothers, what must 
become of me where must I go. If I am not friends with those on the otherside.”79 Similarly 
to the Chickasaws, the Creeks had far reaching trade networks and moved through vast 
portions of the southeast, from their homelands in Georgia and Alabama. Also like the 
Chickasaws, Creeks frequently went on both hunting and raiding excursions as far west as 
the Mississippi River and came into contact with the tribes located along there. Given their 
small size, these petite nations made ideal targets for the Creeks. Clearly, fear of raids from 
large interior tribes, like the Creeks and Chickasaw, was a primary factor in determining both 
where the Tunicas lived and who they allied with.  Little tribes relocated not out of love for 
the Spanish, or because they hated the British, but rather because the European international 
boundary along the Mississippi provided them with some protection from other Indians. 
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80 
The Lower Mississippi River Valley in the 1770s 
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VI. Negotiating Borders  
 Contrary to traditional approaches to colonial history that focus exclusively on 
European struggles for empire in the Lower Mississippi River Valley, Lattanash’s speech 
indicates that throughout the 1770s European land claims remained highly contested and 
contingent upon the cooperation of native peoples. As is evidenced by the failed Loftus 
expedition and early struggles of the Spanish and British to cement land claims and establish 
an international boundary, borderlands diplomacy was negotiated  among Spanish, English, 
and indigenous groups. 
 Rather than stifling opportunities to exploit European rivalries and improve material 
wealth, the attempted creation of the Spanish-English border in the Lower Mississippi Valley 
created a unique opportunity for smaller tribes to engage in play off diplomacy in ways that 
had been previously unavailable. The Tunicas and other small riverside nations seized the 
opportunity to form alliances that they hoped would protect them from other Indian nations 
and allow them to hold onto their lands in the face of a growing settler population. By 
incorporating the experiences of small and large nations into the colonial narrative, it is also 
possible to avoid developing a universal declension narrative for all peoples of the region 
after 1763. In fact, as a result of their adaptability and successful political maneuvering, 
many descendants of the petite nations have been able to remain in their native lands through 
the present. The Tunicas, now combined with some Biloxis, Ofos, and Avoyelles are a 
federally recognized tribe, and currently reside in Marksville Louisiana.81  
 As we can see from the tremendous population declines during the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the petite nations certainly faced many challenges. These tiny groups 
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struggled against territorial pressure and attacks from their Indian neighbors and the 
aggressive European and then American settlers. In the face of violence and political 
uncertainty, the Tunicas and other small Indian groups did their best to use their small 
population base coupled with their proximity to multiple European nations to their 
advantage. Unlike a larger tribe, or confederacy, such as the Creeks, small nations like the 
Tunicas and Biloxis seem to have been able to push the limits of this border more easily. The 
Mississippi served as a protective barrier for the Tunicas against Creek raids precisely 
because the Creek warriors would not cross the international boundary for fear of generating 
a conflict with Spain. Both because the petite nations were minimally taxing on the 
environment itself and not as threatening a presence as a large and powerful Indian group, 
they were able to move between empires without provoking as serious political or military 
backlash as a larger tribe would. This is not to suggest that Tunica efforts to construct 
relationships with both colonial powers did not rankle some feathers; clearly they did. 
However both Spain and England recognized that it would not be worth the cost or effort to 
conduct a military campaign against these tiny tribes close to their forts and settlements, and 
that it was better to try to coax them into alliances with gifts and offers of protection. As long 
as the Tunicas could market themselves as minor threat to colonial stability, as with the 
Loftus campaign, as potential military allies, and as a population base who could physically 
block foreign expansion, they remained valuable to the Spanish and English. The Tunicas’ 
abilities to adapt and wisely negotiate with new colonial groups allowed them to avoid 
removal and survive, and even prosper through the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. 82 
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